Here is another of my papers from my Philosophy of Religion class. This one explores the use of religious language and the "falsification debate." It might sound kind of boring, but the longer I am in this class, the more fun this stuff becomes!
-------------------------------------------------------------------
In these two articles, the authors reflect on two different aspects of religious language. In the first article, Flew and Mitchell center their discussion on the "falsification debate." The basic argument in this debate is whether or not religious statements must be proved with empirical evidence.
Flew begins his argument with a parable about two explorers who come upon a clearing in the jungle. As the two explorers examine the situation, one uses the empirical evidence to come to a conclusion that there is no gardener. The other explorer, the Believer, continues to believe despite the empirical evidence.
Flew argues that, through a process of qualification, the assertion made by the Believer should be empirically provable. According to Flew, if the visible facts contradict the assertion, then it is no longer an assertion at all. He applies this train of thought to Christianity by asking this question of the believer: “What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or the existence of, God?†I would argue that question is invalid for the believer, because it assumes that God is the source of evil. Flew’s argument appears to discount God’s love, and thus his existence, because of the presence of evil in the world. I disagree with that premise so the question is irrelevant.
Mitchell challenges Flew by acknowledging the problem of evil, which appears to be one of Flew’s primary empirical proofs against the assertion of the existence of God. From there, Mitchell shares his own parable about "the Stranger." I believe this parable is relevant, but it still seems based on the assumption that God is the source of evil. Mitchell’s parable is a good illustration of how an inadequate theodicy can be troubling.
Mitchell agrees with Flew that theological utterances must be assertions. However, Mitchell goes on to say that these assertions explain the behavior of the partisan (the Believer). He concludes by considering that theological utterances can be treated in at least three different ways: (1) as provisional hypotheses to be discarded if experience tells against them, (2) as significant articles of faith, (3) as vacuous formulae to which experience makes no difference and which make no difference to life. Believers cannot have the first attitude and must exercise caution to avoid falling into the third.
I believe that Flew has some valid arguments with regards to qualification of assertions, but his premise is built on an unhealthy theodicy. It appears that Flew’s argument centers on his belief that God and evil cannot coexist and that the presence of evil in the world is evidence which disqualifies the assertion that God exists. While this is not his only evidence, it appears to be the significant issue for him. As a matter of fact, I believe the falsification principle is central both to Flew’s conversion to Deism and his notable continued disbelief in a God who interacts with mankind. While the evidence led Flew to disavow his atheism and become a deist, I also believe the lack of evidence continues to prevent him from advocating a belief in the God who most Christians profess.
Mitchell, on the other hand, seems to understand the idea of faith, and his options for dealing with theological utterances acknowledge the significance of faith while warning believers about empty words. We as believers must always take caution to assure that our lives reflect our language. Otherwise they become empty words with no real meaning in our lives.
Tillich takes a different approach to religious language. He considers the significance of religious symbols and signs. He begins his article by specifying the difference between symbols and signs. In his article, Tillich focuses on symbols, the more significant of the two, because "although they are not the same as that which they symbolize, participate in its meaning and power."
Symbols open up a level of reality which cannot be achieved otherwise. They allow us to experience what they symbolize in unique ways by opening up our soul. Symbols function ultimately is to allow us to experience something in a deeper way.
Religious symbols allow us to experience the ultimate reality of the Holy in a special way. Tillich discusses the two levels of religious symbols – the transcendent level and the immanent level. In the transcendent level, which goes beyond empirical reality, we begin with God himself. God is not just a symbol, but as an ultimate being and a person; God is more than we can comprehend.
We also consider the attributes of God (he is love, mercy, power, etc.) and the acts of God (he created the world, sent his son, etc.) as elements of the transcendent level. These all utilize religious language about God that find their place outside of time and space.
On the other hand, there are immanent level symbols that function and exist within time and space. The incarnation is the first of these. There are times and situations where God makes his presence known in this world. While we primarily think of Jesus’ incarnation, this can include any situation where the divine physically engages time and space.
The sacramental is another immanent symbol. This includes such symbols such as the Lord’s Supper. A third element includes things such as church buildings, candles, and other symbols which draw us closer to God.
Tillich ends his article by warning the believer to exercise caution. We cannot allow these symbols to become icons. For example, we must always remember the real power of the cross is found in Christ, not the cross we wear around our necks or view on a wall. We must remember that symbols, while participating in the meaning and power of what they symbolize, are not the source of the meaning and power.
No comments:
Post a Comment