The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines

This is the final short paper for my Philosophy of Religion class. This has been a great experience and I have learned so much. In this essay, I am considering Paul J. Griffiths' thoughts on the uniqueness of religious doctrines.

----------------------------

Griffiths answers those who subscribe to the pluralistic view of religions. His main point, and the focus of his essay, is that many religions include a number of particularist and exclusivist doctrines which contradict the pluralist view. Griffiths argues that there are five important dimensions of religious doctrine. While they overlap, each has its own unique contribution to doctrine. Griffiths uses Christianity – specifically the Anglican variety – as well as Buddhism as his primary examples.

The first dimension addressed is Religious Doctrines as Community Rules. Religious doctrines function as rules which outline the conduct of the members of the religious community who subscribe to a particular faith. Griffiths states: "This dimension of religious doctrines is perhaps the most basic of all; from it the others flow." (p. 590) While all five dimensions have areas where they overlap, this first dimension significantly impacts the other dimensions more than any other. It is the central dimension of all five.

Next, Griffiths discusses Religious Doctrines as Definitions of Community Boundaries. Religious doctrines are central to dictating the boundaries for behavior and belief. Often these boundaries are created to exclude things from the community which are considered untrue, inadequate, or misleading. They are the barriers that protect the community from unwelcome behaviors and beliefs. For the Christian, these can include topics such as the understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ or the Trinity.

The third dimension, Religious Doctrines and the Spiritual Experience of Communities, entails the spiritual experiences that shape the doctrines of and are formed from the doctrines of a religious community. One way Griffiths illustrates this dimension is by discussing how the prayer practices of Christians have both shaped and been shaped by doctrines about the Virgin Mary. Spiritual experience can have a significant impact on what a community believes.

The fourth dimension is Religious Doctrines – Catechesis and Evangelism. These two areas of this dimension focus on making members of religious communities. Catechesis is the process of teaching and training with regards to the doctrinal and practical aspects of the religion. This can include elements of creeds, liturgies, religious practices, and more. The ultimate goal of catechesis is the formation of a faithful Christian or adherent to whatever religion is involved.

Evangelism is the process which converts a person to a particular religion. For those who were not raised in a certain spiritual community, this is the process which recruits new members to that community. When evangelism is successful, new members begin the process of catechesis. Doctrine is generally central to both aspects of this dimension.

The final dimension Griffiths discusses is Religious Doctrines and Salvation. While it may look significantly different for various religious communities, almost every community of faith addresses the subject of salvation in some form. This dimension is one that is especially troublesome for pluralism because doctrines – especially those involving salvation – often cannot be abandoned by a religious community which takes its beliefs seriously. Since many religious groups have a specific doctrine of salvation, they cannot ignore that belief and accept the pluralistic view.

While most religions share these five dimensions, Griffiths does go on to address the uniqueness of Christian doctrine. Christianity is unique because, in the words of Griffiths, "a strong and interesting doctrinal claim is being made here, a claim as to the singularly and salvific centrality of a particular historic event." Christianity makes a unique claim which cannot logically co-exist with any other doctrine of salvation. It teaches that salvation is found in the person of Jesus Christ and through his death, burial, and resurrection. This specific of a salvific doctrine is unique to Christianity.

If we are going to have serious dialogue with other religious groups, the unique nature of Christianity must be a part of the discussion. If we ignore the uniqueness of our faith, then our discussions with other religious communities will be hollow and of significantly less value.

Not only do I affirm Griffiths' position, I feel that his position makes the pluralist position logically impossible. Unless one is willing to discount Christianity as a false religion, she cannot be a pluralist and remain consistent. Either Christianity is a false proposition, or pluralism is a false position. One cannot advocate a philosophy that accepts all religions when at least one of those religious communities accepts an exclusive salvific event.

Religious doctrines are indeed unique as outlined by Griffiths in his essay. While many religions will share some similarities which produce common ground for dialogue, we must acknowledge that many religions, especially the Christian faith, include doctrines which nullify the possibility of pluralism and make a claim for exclusivity.

Unfortunately, some who disagree with pluralism will swing to the other extreme and take exclusivity to the point of arrogance and judgmentalism. We must always approach inter-religious dialogue with a sense of humility balanced with a firm belief in our position. This requires us to be diligent students of our beliefs as well as those with whom we disagree. If we want others to honestly listen to our position, we must be willing to accord them the same attitude of openness. We can listen with an open mind without sacrificing our position or affirming their views as ones to which we subscribe.

One last issue Churches of Christ must consider in the pluralism/exclusivism debate is our exclusivity as a religious community. This is not unique to our tribe, but we have been well known in the Christian community for our claims of exclusivity. While we have our unique doctrines that shape our community as Griffiths discussed, we must be careful not to draw firm lines and distinctions where God has not. If we have a healthy attitude that acknowledges traditions as traditions rather than salvific issues, we can respect our heritage while maintaining healthy dialogue with the rest of the Christian community. We must always be willing to examine every aspect of our doctrine and heritage against the Word of God. While God’s nature will never change, our understanding can and will change as our approach to Scripture and the culture we live in continues to change around us.

Two Separate Domains

After being out of town most of the week with my family, I am back in Michigan. I did have time this week to write another paper for my grad class. This one addresses an article about Stephen Jay Gould about the physical domain and the metaphysical domain. Is it disturbing that this stuff is actually getting to be fun?

----------------------------------------

Gould focuses most of his article around statements and papers presented by Pope Pius XII and Pope John Paul II. He utilizes these two articles to contrast how the situation with regards to evolution and creation has changed in the last fifty years.

These papal statements are the framework in which Gould reaffirms the NOMA (nonoverlapping magisterial) principle. This principle states that science and religion are two separate fields which do not overlap and have unique magisteriums (domains of teaching authority). Pius argued that since there was evidence for evolution, it can be accepted as long as the divine infusion of the soul is accepted as well. Since evolution falls within the magisterium of science and the soul is in the magisterium of religion, these two apparently do not conflict.

Gould rejoices in the fact that Pope John Paul II supports the advancements in science that reinforce evolution. This goes beyond Pius’ statement which still left evolution as questionable.

Gould describes an important aspect of the NOMA concept when he states, "If religion can no longer dictate the nature of factual conclusions residing properly with the magisterium of science, then scientists cannot claim higher insight into moral truth from any superior knowledge of the world’s empirical constitution."

I do not believe that the NOMA concept is logical or realistic. The more we learn about matter, energy, and the details of the universe, it appears as though there is inevitable overlap. NOMA will grant that there is some "gray area" where the two magisterium meet, but I would argue that there is overlap. Science cannot remain independent of morality and morality cannot exist outside of the realm of science.

If we believe in a Creator God, then we cannot accept the NOMA concept. However, the idea of evolution allows us to disconnect the moral God from the creative God. This unhealthy divorce is damaging to a holistic view of the universe, our world, and our lives.

The NOMA concept appears to be a way for religious people to avoid science and scientists to avoid morality. However, it is crucial that this not happen. When we say that science and religion do not share domains of teaching authority, we are robbing the religious person the opportunity to explore God and faith though scientific study. In addition, the scientist will tend to look at the world with less morality. This entire worldview disagrees with my view that the scientific world and the spiritual world overlap.

Gould’s theory assumes two paradigms of world-views: physical/scientific and metaphysical/religious. This is a faulty foundation because the metaphysical is the overlying structure for both. I believe that Gould revisits the mistake of the Scientific Revolution by attempting to separate the physical realm from the metaphysical. I would argue that the physical world is simply the empirically measurable aspects of the metaphysical realm.

One of the consequences of this separation of the physical from the metaphysical is a separation of morality from science. This can create a host of dilemmas in our modern world. As science explores cloning, stem-cell use, euthanasia, atomic weapons, and other modern scientific discoveries, Gould wants to remove morality from science at a time it is needed most. Not only is this theory faulty on a philosophical level, on a practical level it could have damaging consequences.

So where do we go from here? How can we react to Gould’s theory and provide a more holistic model? We must begin by acknowledging that science and theology overlap, but they each also have their own "space." Science and theology are partners that cannot be separated. For example, religion has contributed to many of the scientific achievements, especially in areas of medicine. Without the metaphysical influence of religion and theology, science may not have been as driven to learn more. Christianity had a significant impact over the last two millenniums to influence scientific thought.

I have already discussed the importance of morality in the realm of science, but what about the influence of science on religion? We must remember that scientific/physical realm is simply the empirical manifestation of the metaphysical realm. It is only part of a bigger picture. Therefore, it is essential to keep in mind that the physical realm cannot dominate the metaphysical. As we have learned in recent years with the developments described by those such as Schroeder, the more we learn about the physical world, the more the majesty of the metaphysical world is revealed to us.

One specific area where this is very important for our young people is in the area of evolution. As we wrestle with the origins of life, this balance of the physical and metaphysical is crucial. If science is the measurable part of the metaphysical, this has major implications in the evolution/creation debate. Rather than exclusively arguing the evidence for evolution against the evidence for creation (which is basically operating in Gould’s world-view), we must teach our young people to think critically and evaluate the physical (scientific) and metaphysical (moral) aspects of the origins of life.

The Falsification Debate and Religious Language

Here is another of my papers from my Philosophy of Religion class. This one explores the use of religious language and the "falsification debate." It might sound kind of boring, but the longer I am in this class, the more fun this stuff becomes!

-------------------------------------------------------------------

In these two articles, the authors reflect on two different aspects of religious language. In the first article, Flew and Mitchell center their discussion on the "falsification debate." The basic argument in this debate is whether or not religious statements must be proved with empirical evidence.

Flew begins his argument with a parable about two explorers who come upon a clearing in the jungle. As the two explorers examine the situation, one uses the empirical evidence to come to a conclusion that there is no gardener. The other explorer, the Believer, continues to believe despite the empirical evidence.

Flew argues that, through a process of qualification, the assertion made by the Believer should be empirically provable. According to Flew, if the visible facts contradict the assertion, then it is no longer an assertion at all. He applies this train of thought to Christianity by asking this question of the believer: “What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or the existence of, God?” I would argue that question is invalid for the believer, because it assumes that God is the source of evil. Flew’s argument appears to discount God’s love, and thus his existence, because of the presence of evil in the world. I disagree with that premise so the question is irrelevant.

Mitchell challenges Flew by acknowledging the problem of evil, which appears to be one of Flew’s primary empirical proofs against the assertion of the existence of God. From there, Mitchell shares his own parable about "the Stranger." I believe this parable is relevant, but it still seems based on the assumption that God is the source of evil. Mitchell’s parable is a good illustration of how an inadequate theodicy can be troubling.

Mitchell agrees with Flew that theological utterances must be assertions. However, Mitchell goes on to say that these assertions explain the behavior of the partisan (the Believer). He concludes by considering that theological utterances can be treated in at least three different ways: (1) as provisional hypotheses to be discarded if experience tells against them, (2) as significant articles of faith, (3) as vacuous formulae to which experience makes no difference and which make no difference to life. Believers cannot have the first attitude and must exercise caution to avoid falling into the third.

I believe that Flew has some valid arguments with regards to qualification of assertions, but his premise is built on an unhealthy theodicy. It appears that Flew’s argument centers on his belief that God and evil cannot coexist and that the presence of evil in the world is evidence which disqualifies the assertion that God exists. While this is not his only evidence, it appears to be the significant issue for him. As a matter of fact, I believe the falsification principle is central both to Flew’s conversion to Deism and his notable continued disbelief in a God who interacts with mankind. While the evidence led Flew to disavow his atheism and become a deist, I also believe the lack of evidence continues to prevent him from advocating a belief in the God who most Christians profess.

Mitchell, on the other hand, seems to understand the idea of faith, and his options for dealing with theological utterances acknowledge the significance of faith while warning believers about empty words. We as believers must always take caution to assure that our lives reflect our language. Otherwise they become empty words with no real meaning in our lives.

Tillich takes a different approach to religious language. He considers the significance of religious symbols and signs. He begins his article by specifying the difference between symbols and signs. In his article, Tillich focuses on symbols, the more significant of the two, because "although they are not the same as that which they symbolize, participate in its meaning and power."

Symbols open up a level of reality which cannot be achieved otherwise. They allow us to experience what they symbolize in unique ways by opening up our soul. Symbols function ultimately is to allow us to experience something in a deeper way.

Religious symbols allow us to experience the ultimate reality of the Holy in a special way. Tillich discusses the two levels of religious symbols – the transcendent level and the immanent level. In the transcendent level, which goes beyond empirical reality, we begin with God himself. God is not just a symbol, but as an ultimate being and a person; God is more than we can comprehend.

We also consider the attributes of God (he is love, mercy, power, etc.) and the acts of God (he created the world, sent his son, etc.) as elements of the transcendent level. These all utilize religious language about God that find their place outside of time and space.

On the other hand, there are immanent level symbols that function and exist within time and space. The incarnation is the first of these. There are times and situations where God makes his presence known in this world. While we primarily think of Jesus’ incarnation, this can include any situation where the divine physically engages time and space.

The sacramental is another immanent symbol. This includes such symbols such as the Lord’s Supper. A third element includes things such as church buildings, candles, and other symbols which draw us closer to God.

Tillich ends his article by warning the believer to exercise caution. We cannot allow these symbols to become icons. For example, we must always remember the real power of the cross is found in Christ, not the cross we wear around our necks or view on a wall. We must remember that symbols, while participating in the meaning and power of what they symbolize, are not the source of the meaning and power.

Soul-making Theodicy

Here is another paper from my grad class. This one addresses John Hick's article on his "Soul-making Theodicy."

----------------------------------------------------------

John Hick's theodicy emerges from his inability to realize the compatibility of the concept of God as both limitlessly powerful and limitlessly good and loving and the problem of evil. In his proposal, Hick provides an approach to this apparent conflict by revisiting and revising the Irenaean approach to theodicy.

The Irenaean approach to theodicy looks at the world as a "person-making world" which utilizes an evolutionary approach to the development of human beings. This is contrasted against the more historically popular Augustinian approach which begins with the fall and is known in modern times as "the free will defense."

It appears to me that Hick begins with an evolutionary presupposition when he writes, "For more educated inhabitants of the modern world regard the biblical story of Adam and Eve, and their temptation by the devil, as myth rather than story." He goes on to discuss how most "educated" people today believe that humans have evolved from lower forms of life.

Irenaean theodicy is built upon a two-stage approach to the creation of human beings. First, the "image of God" was a gradual process which brought forth human beings. In contrast to Augustinian theodicy, which supports the fall, Hick’s approach rejects the Creation story we find in Genesis and existence "in the image of God" as potential at the outset, rather than something to be realized progressively over time.

This approach then moves on to the divine "likeness," which is where modern human beings find themselves after experiencing one’s own free responses. Rather than the "paradise lost" we find in the Creation account in Genesis, Hick’s theodicy looks at the ideal state solely as a future and unrealized goal, not as something lost in the Garden.

Hick’s theodicy is extremely evolutionary. One of his arguments hinges on his belief that God could create beings that would, in essence, not sin. Hick states it this way: "It appears to me that a perfectly good being, although formally free to sin, would in fact never do so." One of his examples to support this position is Newton’s first law of motion. While this is an interesting consideration, laws of science do not function in the same manner as behaviors of living creatures. I believe that Hick chose a weak illustration to support an argument that does not make sense.

Hick goes on to argue that his theodicy makes moral goodness even more valuable because it is earned, not given. In other words, Hick argues that since God created imperfect beings who had to attain to a higher good, their morality is more valuable than one that God created in the first place. In one sense, this appears to be aligned with free will. However, the significant difference is that Hick argues that morality was never a part of the original design for man. This understanding of the source of morality disregards the Genesis story and removes much of God’s role in the creation story.

He also writes about the evolutionary idea of "survival of the fittest" and argues that natural evil helps develop our character. Since humans are forced to learn in an environment that includes natural evil, pain and death contribute to the growth of one’s moral nature. According to Hick, this world we live in – with its challenges and dangers – exists to help in the person-making process. Removing this pain and suffering would impair moral growth.

Hick does concede that this person-making process does not end in this world and continues in a future world, but his conclusions differ greatly from mine. He argues for universal salvation and states that, "the completeness of the justification must depend on the completeness, or universality, of the salvation achieved." In other words, according to Hick’s theology, everyone must be saved to complete God’s plan. This is basically an inevitable obligation on the part of a God whom one believes created every human being imperfect. If God made them incomplete creatures and life is the effort to be better, He would have to allow all of them to enter Heaven, regardless of their place on the journey.

I disagree with Hick’s theodicy for a variety of reasons. It contradicts the meta-narrative of God’s people in their struggle to regain what was lost in the fall. In my opinion, it negates – or at best diminishes – the significance of the cross. And it supports the idea that man was not initially created in the image and likeness of God. Rather we are evolving into what God intended us to be.

In his effort to justify his belief that God and evil cannot co-exist, Hick has created a theodicy that appears to be grounded more in humanism than in good theology. While some of his arguments may find a base in humanism, very few appear to take seriously God’s mission in the world to renew creation.

While I fundamentally disagree with many of Hick’s positions and opinions, I do not believe his theodicy is completely irrelevant. While I feel it is misapplied, there is a sense that life is about person-making. As individuals, communities, and the world as a whole wrestle with the implications and impact of sin, God is calling each of us to use life’s experiences as an opportunity to grow in our terms of our "God-likeness." In our individual journeys as well as the meta-narrative of human existence, God is calling us to learn from good times and bad to develop more fully into the people he intended us to be. This is where Hick and Irenaus do offer something of value in our understanding of evil, sin, and how God can coexist with these negative aspects of the world.

The Free Will Defense

This is a paper for my grad class examining an article about "The Free Will Defense" by Alvin Plantinga.

---------------------------------------------

In his article, Alvin Plantinga sets out to address those who would argue that an omnipotent God and evil cannot coexist. He especially addresses Mackie’s paper, "Evil and Omnipotence." I found the first part of Plantinga’s essay challenging and difficult to follow at times, but he discusses the importance of theodicy showing that an all-loving, all-powerful God is not logically inconsistent with the problem of evil. This becomes the foundation upon which the Free Will Defense is built.

Plantinga begins with the premise that an omnipotent God exists and has a good reason for creating a world in which evils exists. The purpose of the Defense is not to find the reason or purpose of any specific evils, but rather to say what might possibly be God’s reason for allowing evil of any type to exist.

One important belief of the Free Will Defense is that there may be a kind of good that God cannot bring about without permitting evil. In addition, a person must be free to make choices with regards to action. True freedom must give a person the ability to perform an action or refrain from it without direct interference. While one may be able to predict what someone will do, a person must have the power to choose their actions.

Plantinga outlines several other requirements as he defines free will. He states that an action is morally significant if it would be wrong to perform the action but right to refrain from it, or visa versa. In addition, someone would be considered significantly free if he is free with respect to a morally significant action. He also distinguishes between moral evil, evil that results from human activity, and natural evil, all other evils.

These thoughts come together in Plantinga’s initial statement of the Free Will Defense, which states, "A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all." One of the foundational beliefs is that in order for us to be capable of moral good we must have the freedom to choose moral evil. In other words, our goodness is only as meaningful as our opportunity for doing evil.

It is quite possible that God could not have created a universe that contained moral good without moral evil being present. While some would argue that God could have created a world where people only made good choices, this would contradict the idea of free will. In a sense, it would negate the value of moral good by eliminating the option of moral evil.

Others might argue that it is possible to do only what is right, even when presented the option to commit evil. However, God, with His wisdom and power, likely created the best possible world that still provided mankind with the opportunity to choose. So in order to create the best possible world, God created a world where there is the existential possibility for evil to exist.

While God could have created any world, the world God creates must be a world in which he exists. It must also be a world in which moral good exists while people have the opportunity to make choices, whether for good or evil.  God could not have created any world he wanted, but only worlds which contain moral good and moral evil. Otherwise, it would not be a world where true freedom exists.

In conclusion, Plantinga argues that God’s power does not allow him to create a world in which free will exists without moral evil. While God is all-powerful, his power cannot contradict what is logically true, that for moral good to exist, moral evil must be an option. Plantinga briefly addresses natural evil at the close of his essay when he discusses transworld depravity and that everyone suffers from that.

God, in his wisdom, created a world where he, the ultimate source of moral good, can exist with his creation, which has the freedom to choose good or evil. This free will makes it possible for a perfect being to coexist with beings who can decide to do what is right or what is wrong. Our freedom neither negates nor reduces God’s power or goodness. It makes it all the more wonderful.

The Analogical Teleological Argument

Yet another paper I wrote for my grad class. It discusses an article by William Paley entitled The Analogical Teleological Argument. This is another nerdy, read at your own risk article. My thanks once again to Dr. Rubel Shelly for his corrections, suggestions, and challenges that helped shape this paper. I am now "caught up" on posting these things, so hopefully I will have something a little lighter next time. ;-)

--------------------------------------------------------

Paley begins his essay contrasting the difference between discovering a stone and a watch. While a stone has little visible sign of design, a watch, with all of its intricate moving parts, cries out for a creator. The way that all of the parts work together tells us "that there must have existed at some time, and some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer: who comprehended its construction and designed its use."

Paley continues by providing a number of supporting thoughts to defend his argument for design:

• The conclusion is not weakened if we have never seen a watch made.


• If the watch does not always run exactly right, it does not invalidate the conclusion.


• If we do not understand the role of each part, that does not bring uncertainty to our argument.


• One should not argue this was just one of many possible combinations that would have worked.


• We cannot imagine a principle of order apart from the intelligence of the watchmaker.


• It would be surprising to think that the mechanism of the watch was only there to make us think it was designed.


• It would be just as surprising to argue that the watch was simply the result of the laws of metallic nature.


• Being told you know nothing about the matter does not drive us from our conclusion.

After laying out his argument, Paley compares an eye to a telescope. As much as the telescope has an obvious creator, the eye, an even more complicated "device," must have a creator. He also argues that "the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art in the complexity, subtly, and curiosity of the mechanism." The complexity of the eye – and its greater complexity than a telescope – confirms a creator.

Paley concludes his argument by comparing the eye and the watch. He reminds us once again that this is a matter of examining the evidence. I believe that Paley’s argument supports the belief in a creator. The intricate design of so many parts of creation points to an ultimate designer.

It is difficult to comprehend a world as complex as ours evolving into what it is today. Something as simple as a single human organ (e.g., kidney, brain) shows the complexity of our bodies. I am convinced that the more we learn through science and research, the more Paley’s argument is reinforced. As science discovers more and more about the intricate design of the human body and other aspects of creation, the Teleological Argument becomes even stronger evidence for the existence of God. As evidence for this, one need only take account of the recent works of such scientists as Gerald Schroeder and the impact of their science-based arguments on philosophers such as Antony Flew.

The popularity of Paley’s well-known argument declined dramatically in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because of the work of Charles Darwin. Darwin’s evolutionary model claimed that the (apparent) order in living things has resulted from natural selection rather than divine creation. Today Paley’s argument is finding renewed debate and discussion as the "Intelligent Design" movement and scientists such as Richard Dawkins reconsider Paley’s argument in light of recent scientific discoveries.

While I believe Paley’s argument makes some excellent points, there is at least one area of possible weakness that merits discussion. As a "creation focused" argument, Paley’s argument could be used by a Deist as well as one who believes in the God who continues to work in the world. To be fair, I don’t believe that Paley set out to prove the existence of a God though His ongoing works. Rather, he hoped to consider the evidence from creation and show that this line of thought is a strong argument for the existence of God as a Creator.

The Cosmological Argument

This is another paper I wrote for my current grad class. It discusses an article by Bruce Reichenbach entitled The Cosmological Argument. This is another nerdy, read at your own risk article. My thanks to Dr. Rubel Shelly for his corrections, suggestions, and challenges that helped shape this paper.

-------------------------------------------------

In his essay on the Cosmological Argument, Reichenbach not only presents his points and opinions, he does an excellent job of addressing many of the objections to his position. He begins by reviewing some of the earlier approaches to arguments for the existence of God. In this section of his essay, he discusses the explanation for God. He explores the Principle of Sufficient Reason, according to which "no fact can be real or existing, and no statement true unless it has a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise." While considering this principle, Reichenbach goes even further to detail the nuances of the principle and how it fits the Cosmological Argument. He argues that, "a moderate version of the principle, which holds that what is contingent or what comes into being requires a sufficient reason why it exists or comes into being." This is one of the foundations of the Cosmological argument because everything in the world is contingent and needs a reason to exist.

He also comments on the necessity of scientific and personal explanations. While scientific explanation requires natural features, events, and processes or conditions to occur, personal explanation is explained through the actions of a person. When dealing with the existence of God, Reichenbach argues that both are critical.

Another central question addresses the issue of what needs explanation. The argument for a sustaining cause deals with why the universe exists. In this argument, we would argue that contingent beings, those things which the universe consists of, are dependent on other beings for their existence. The argument for an initiating cause discusses the cause of the coming of the universe. This argument would advance the idea that since the universe exists, it must have a cause. While both arguments have some validity, Reichenbach warns us to be careful in situations where an explanation in terms of God competes with that of science. As science discovers more and more, we must look to science not as our enemy, but as a friend who often fills the gaps in ways that enforce the Cosmological Argument, not weaken it.

Reichenbach goes on to outline a Deductive Cosmological Argument from Contingency. This argument would advance the idea that a contingent being exists and that it has a cause or explanation for existence. Since contingents require another being to cause or explain their existence, a necessary being must be included among the beings which exist. Therefore, a necessary being must exist. This argument hinges on the fact that "contingent beings alone cannot cause or explain the existence of a contingent being." I agree with this statement and its validity. Therefore, I believe this argument is sound.

During his examination of this argument, Reichenbach openly discusses the objections to and possible problems with this method of thinking. The first major objection he tackles is the idea that the universe simply exists. Most of his explanation circles around the writings of Bertrand Russell, who argues that the Universe "just is." However, Reichenbach argues that the source of the universe demands an explanation. While he states that quantum physics raises some questions about indetermination on the subatomic level, Reichenbach would argue that even these subatomic particles require a cause. Contingent beings still need a necessary being.

The second objection he addresses is the idea that explaining the individual parts of the universe is sufficient to disprove the existence of God. Hume even argued that uniting the parts of the universe is an act of the mind and has influence on the nature of things. Reichenbach argues that how the parts are arranged is crucial to the argument because examining the parts may very well give an incomplete picture of the whole. In addition, we must consider why these parts exist and their role in the universe.

The third objection confronted the notion that the conclusion is contradictory. This objection centers on the fact that the cosmological argument presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument. Reichenbach explains that a necessary being is not self-contradictory, and its existence is not intrinsically impossible. He argues that this is not the logically necessary existence that Kant discusses. Rather, necessity in the Cosmological Argument is understood in the sense of a factual necessity. This is a convincing point because without a source or cause, there is nothing.

Reichenbach finishes by defending his thesis that God provides the best explanation. His essential claim is that God is not scientifically explainable and does not depend on anything else for His existence. In addition, God provides the best explanation of our expectations of the universe. Since there must be a cause to the universe and God is the simplest and most reasonable answer, the God of religion must exist and is the cause of all creation.

I appreciated his approach because he was not afraid to tackle objections and other points of view. Reichenbach did not try to cover up these arguments against his opinions. Rather, he addressed them in a variety of ways. He acknowledged those times when others made a valid point. But he also considered the weaknesses of those counterpoints. For example, when dealing with Hume’s quantum physics argument, Reichenbach affirmed the challenges but went on to see the limits of Hume’s point. By considering and talking about the objections and arguments, Reichenbach actually helps strengthen his task to prove God’s existence. The Cosmological Argument accomplishes that goal very well.

Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action

This is a paper I wrote for my current grad class. It discusses an article by Nelson Pike entitled "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action." It's kind of nerdy so read at your own risk.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Much of Pike’s essay centers on the example of Jones mowing his lawn. The primary argument is that, if God is omniscient, humans cannot have voluntary actions. In continuing to revisit this illustration, Pike reinforces the idea that, if God knew in the past what we were going to do, we would not have the choice to decide what we will do. With the example of Jones, Pike argues that, if Jones decided not to mow the lawn, then Jones would cause one of God’s beliefs to be false. In a sense, Pike’s belief is that God’s foreknowledge precludes us from having the choice to change because it makes God a liar.

I disagree with Pike’s assessment, because he appears to consider God a temporal being who cannot work independently of time. When we treat God as a human and give Him human limitations, we will see his power reduced and expectations diminished. Pike argues that, if a human changes her mind and avoids acting in the way “God knows,” then she is going to prove that God is not perfect.

I believe that Pike’s argument fails because he does not take into consideration the belief that that God functions in a way where time does not constrain Him. God’s knowledge 80 years ago about something today does not mean that it was going to happen. I believe that God’s knowledge exists outside of the boundaries of time.

This presupposition is what much of the argument hinges on. If we accept that God’s belief “80 years ago” is a belief constrained by the limitations of time, then it is true that Jones must mow His lawn or make God into a liar. However, if we can acknowledge that God ultimately exists and functions outside the limitations of time, then His beliefs are not from the past or in the future. They are eternal beliefs that reflect how the world is at a given time, not what God knows will happen. This is a very challenging concept to grasp, but I believe that God exists outside of time, but is able to work within time. Much like a two-dimensional world cannot relate to three dimensions, I believe that God is in a dimension beyond our comprehension. This is what makes this dilemma difficult to figure out or understand. However, I do think that God is able to relate to us in our limited comprehension. That is part of the miracle of God; while He is timeless, He finds ways to interact with His creation which is bound by time.

I believe that God is omniscient, but humans still take voluntary actions. Even if God knows tonight what I am doing tomorrow, that does not ascribe Him control over all of my daily decisions. Because God is the “I AM,” He is a being that exists outside of the boundaries of this world. His knowledge of past, present, and future events in our lives does not rob us of voluntary action. As a matter of fact, this type of knowledge allows God to be active in the world providentially.